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Born into Crisis: 
Public Service Broadcasters in South East Europe 
 
Sally Broughton Micova 
 
 
Scholars and concerned policymakers have discussed an emerging crisis in 
public service broadcasting [PSB] for more than two decades. Much of this 
discussion has focused on the adaptations and transformations that 
established PSB companies in Western Europe should make in responding to 
increasing competition, technological changes and reduced protections in 
consequence to the drive to create an increasingly stronger European 
Common Market. The continuing economic crisis is a pressurising concern as 
PSB operators across Europe face cuts, budget caps and losses in 
advertising revenue. Another cause for concern is related to the increasingly 
interventionist approach of the European Commission [EC] in competition 
rules about State Aid policy (Harcourt, 2005; Humphreys, 2009). PSB 
companies are mandated to redefine and often to limit their remits as various 
commercial interests challenge their ventures into new media. The 
combination of financial insecurity, policy intervention pointedly seeking to 
limit the drive to become public service media [PSM] companies, and the 
potential of public uncertainty about its position and remit has created a 
condition that amounts to a crisis for PSB in much of Europe.  
 Although the nature and severity of the crisis may be comparatively 
new for PSB in Western Europe, this chapter looks at locations where it was 
born into crisis. As the public service sector fights to regain the initiative in its 
struggle with and against the commercial sector in media, there are important 
lessons to be learned from the experience of new PSB companies in the 
younger independent states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)1. Their 
experiences suggest three questions that are now keenly important for PSB in 
the West:  
 
• What risks are entailed in various options for financing? 
• How much political independence can be reasonably expected? 
• Must PSB do everything, or is it wiser to narrow the remit? 
 
Because reliance on Western models was common throughout the former 
communist and socialist states of CEE (Jakubowicz, 2004), looking at PSB in 
these states can clarify potential challenges when the traditional approach is 
faced with extreme challenges in those places where the model was first 
developed.  
This chapter looks at two of the smaller states within this larger group, 
Slovenia and Macedonia, to address the three questions. The findings 
suggest points of general concern and should be of particular interest for 
other small states, not only CEE but also in the West. I begin with an 
exploration of the legacy of transformation from socialism to sudden 
competition and how that differs from the Western experience. I then look 
specifically at the roles of both license fee and advertising revenue. This 
bridges into discussion about questions of governance and political 
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independence. The chapter then discusses the pros and cons of narrowing 
the PSB mandate based on findings from the cases, highlighting the way co-
operation helps to fill gaps. This unofficial and seemingly unconscious 
narrowing of the remit in response to financial and political pressures is useful 
for PSB companies attempting to regain the initiative in the face of strong 
challengers and complex challenges.   
 
 
From zero to sudden competition 
 
PSB operators in CEE have a very different history compared with the West 
where PSB developed slowly, typically enjoying a long period of paternalistic 
monopoly before media markets emerged (ibid. Jakubowicz, 2008: 118). 
There was considerable time for them to adjust. In CEE, however, former 
state broadcasters had to change rapidly in the midst of sweeping revolution, 
and, in the case of Yugoslavia, dissolution. The broader systemic changes 
characterised by the onslaught of radical liberalisation accounts for the 
dramatic emergence of private commercial broadcasters, as well as the 
necessity for these state broadcasting companies to become something else. 
Bašič-Hrvatin (2002) aptly described the conditions these broadcasters faced 
at the start of their transformation to become public service broadcasters:  
 
The key problems were economic crisis, absence of adequate 
media legislation, difficulties in achieving political and financial 
independence for public service broadcasters, low professional 
standards, chaotic deregulation and liberalization of the media 
market, outdated technological infrastructure and delays in 
introducing new information and communication technologies, 
and finally, the lack of a clear perspective on the future of PSB 
(21). 
 
Clearly they were born in and into crisis. It should be emphasise that 
PSB in this region was not created from scratch. There were large, over-
staffed former state monopolies already in place. The challenges they faced in 
efforts to transform were partly legacies of their former status and partly a 
more generally shared need to cope with sudden change in the wider social 
and economic system. This is not to say that all these companies made the 
transformation in the same way, or with the same degree of success. One 
could argue that some are still quite far from being public service in anything 
other than name, mostly because of financial and political dependency issues 
that are discussed below. I make no claim that Slovenia and Macedonia 
represent the experience of all CEE states. For one thing, as former Yugoslav 
republics with just over 2 million inhabitants each, there was the additional 
shock of suddenly being small after having been part of a much larger system 
with more extensive resources. However, I maintain that their experiences 
highlight points of common concern for PSB, although each instance must be 
contextualised. 
 
Suddenly a different system 
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The collapse of the socialist Yugoslav system provided Slovenia and 
Macedonia the opportunity to redefine their respective media systems. Like 
most other CEE countries, these states did not attempt devising completely 
new models. Instead, as Splichal (2001) described, they were caught up in a 
generalisable imitation of Western practices. This was characterised by rapid 
gains in the pursuit of liberalisation and de-monopolisation in the media 
sector, with slow or incomplete progress in democratising media systems. 
Although ostensibly copying the dual system of broadcasting in Western 
Europe, the push to break former state monopolies meant transformation to 
PSB took place in a rapidly emerging and highly competitive environment.  
Although Radio Ljubljana in Slovenia can trace its beginnings to 1928, 
both Radio Television Slovenia [RTVSLO] and Macedonian Radio Television 
[MRT] really developed as part of the Yugoslav state broadcasting system, 
serving as regional broadcasters for their respective republics (Zei, 2004: 
215). Following independence, Slovenia began granting commercial licenses 
in March 1993 and by April 1994 the frequencies had largely been allocated 
(Bašič-Hrvatin & Petkovic, 2007: 129). The law transforming RTVSLO into a 
public broadcaster with a separate governing body drawn from civil society 
and with secure funding was passed in 1994 (Bašič-Hrvatin, 2002: 23-24)2. 
Through consolidation of local licenses, the now national Pop TV rapidly 
became the largest commercial station and the greatest competition for 
RTVSLO (Bašič-Hrvatin & Petkovic, 2007: 135). It appears that in the 
establishment of the ‘dual system’, the private sector was given priority.  
In Macedonia, a wealth of private broadcasters appeared shortly after 
independence, reaching as many as 250 (Ciunova-Suleska, 2007: 145). The 
country finally passed a Law on Broadcasting in 1997, and only began 
granting concessions to broadcasters two years later in 1999 (Šopar, 2005: 
171). The 1997 law set out governance structures with a license fee for MRT, 
but by this time two national television stations (A1 and Sitel) had already 
captured large shares of the potential audience, and the same for two private 
national radio channels. Although legalisation through concessions halved the 
number of broadcasters, the country was still left with an excessive number in 
relation to its population (Ciunova-Suleska, 2007). After a decade the two 
main television channels of MRT had a combined audience share of less than 
12 percent. Private broadcasters also held 95 percent of the advertising 
market (Šopar, 2008: 331-332). Private broadcasters had seized the 
opportunity created by a legislative vacuum. By the time legislation to regulate 
them and to transform the former state monopoly into PSB finally caught up, 
competition was already fierce.  
 
At a different pace 
 
This is a very different experience compared with small states in 
Western Europe where the pace of change has been slower and steps taken 
by governments often more conservative. For example, in Portugal PSB 
maintained a monopoly until 1993 (O'Hagan & Jennings, 2003) and in Austria 
until 2001 (Steinmaurer, 2009). Although many small states protected their 
PSB operators from domestic competition as long as possible, they could not 
stop competition from specialised, foreign and transnational programmes 
offered on multi-channel services (especially cable and satellite TV). Such 
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competition also impacts the most well established PSB companies in large 
states.  
A key difference is that before the influx of cable and other platforms 
offering multi-channel services, most Western PSB companies had long 
periods of dominate status in domestic markets and were able to consolidate 
their positions. This means that Western PSB faced new challenges from 
well-resourced positions and were able to experiment with new services and 
technologies to reach specific audiences (Johannes Bardoel & d'Haenens, 
2008). This was just as true for small countries. For example, Austria and 
Switzerland invested in strong PSBs to counterbalance the impact of foreign 
content and stations from neighbouring countries (Trappel, 1991, 2010). In 
comparison, Slovenian and Macedonian PSB faced high levels of competition 
from the outset, and from domestic broadcasters as well as from foreign 
channels available on multi-channel services. This emerged rapidly, before 
their financing and governance structures were well established or their 
positions at all secure in these markets. This suggests that policy makers in 
the West looking at how their PSB can regain the initiative in what is a rapidly 
changing, highly competitive environment should consider the lessons from 
these cases before major cuts or overhauls to already established systems 
are aggressively pursued. This is particularly true for other small states 
because smallness is an issue when it comes to financing PSB (see 
especially Lowe & Nissen 2011).  
  
 
The risks of license fees and advertising 
 
Slovenian and Macedonian laws set out financing systems for RTVSLO and 
MRT that include a license fee as the primary source of income, combined 
with advertising and direct funding from the state budget for certain activities. 
This mixed revenue model is intended to provide stability through the license 
fee and independence through the ability to also generate revenue via 
advertising. However, reaching either objective isn’t straightforward. 
 
(In)secure license fee 
 
Although many PSB companies are allowed some amount of 
advertising, with the exception of most of those located in northern Europe, 
the license fee is the main source of income for PSB in Europe. This type of 
public funding, a kind of dedicated tax earmarked for a specific purpose, is not 
only a method for financing but also contributes to the definition of what public 
service is supposed to be about – a public good funded directly by the public 
for whom it is required to provide service. This ideal construct is not without 
problems. First, agreeing the level of the license fee is always a political issue 
(O'Hagan & Jennings, 2003: 48). The cases in this chapter highlight how 
easily a theoretically ‘stable’ license fee can become practically unstable in 
the hands of politicians. Second, there are limits to how much can be raised 
by a license fee, especially from a small population and in times of economic 
hardship.  
The license fee settlement is established by law in both Slovenia and 
Macedonia, and is therefore subject to political debate and compromise 
  
 
5 
agreement. Current Slovenian law forbids the government from raising the 
license fee by more than 10 percent, and then only if economically justified 
(Republic of Slovenia, 2005, art. 31). Increases are supposed to be aligned 
with inflation, however since 1994 successive governments have used the 
amount to manipulate RTVSLO’s financial standing (See Bašič-Hrvatin & 
Petkovic, 2007: 150-153) thereby leaving RTVSLO vulnerable both to its 
competition and other forms of manipulation.  
In Macedonia the license fee settlement became an issue in the 2006 
parliamentary elections. Soon after taking office the winning party called for a 
drastic reduction from 350 denars (€5.70) to 130 denars (€2.11). A cut of 
more than 60 percent represents the most drastic instability any PSB 
company has faced. When times are tight and politics are tough, the license 
fee is a convenient target for competing politicians. Even the BBC faced the 
need to head off attacks on its license fee, proposing a three-year license fee 
cap beginning in 2010 in the face of continued economic difficulty and a 
change in government (BBC, 2010). It is increasingly clear that the license fee 
cannot be counted on as a sure thing more or less anywhere, particularly in 
times of economic or political instability.  
Moreover, the total potential for license fee revenue depends on the 
size and respective wealth of the country. A PSB company can only raise so 
much from a small population, depending on GDP and income per capita 
(Lowe & Nissen 2011). With a high compliance rate, in 2009 RTVSLO 
received just over €82.5 million, or 64.1 percent, of its total income from the 
license fee (Radio Television Slovenia, 2009). On the other hand, with what 
its calls difficulties3 in collecting the tax, MRTV raised only €922,784 in 2009 
(Macedonian Radio Television, 2010). Although since that time collection 
responsibility was transferred to the Public Revenue Office in January 2011, 
and collection rates have increased significantly, simple mathematics 
indicates that even if the collection rates were as high as in Slovenia, MRT 
would raise just over €5 million. Considering the total of just under half a 
million households and a correspondingly limited number of businesses on 
which to draw, neither RTVSLO nor MRT can come close to budgets that 
typify many PSB operators in small, richer countries in the West, much less 
giants as in Britain and Germany. These amounts are also incomparable to 
the revenue that commercial stations can raise through advertising and other 
income sources.  
 
The commercialisation risk 
 
Advertising is allowed for RTVSLO and MRT, however RTVSLO enjoys 
significantly more opportunity than MRT.4 One of the most sensitive issues is 
the significance of prime time. RTVSLO’s opportunity is restricted and MRT is 
not allowed advertising at all in prime time. According to MRT Director Petar 
Karanakov, “It’s as if someone tied your hands and tied your feet and then 
said – swim”. Even without limits on advertising, both companies would have 
to compete ruthlessly for sizable income in such small advertising markets 
(Puppis, 2009; Trappel, 1991). In Macedonia the estimated television 
advertising income for 2009 was only €25.6 million and largely divided among 
the five national commercial stations (Broadcasting Council of Republic of 
Macedonia, 2010a: 101). RTVSLO may have the potential for more 
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advertising revenue, but also struggles with its commercial rivals, the biggest 
of which is PopTV. The gross television advertising market in 2009 in 
Slovenia was estimated at €314 million, of which Pop TV received 
approximately 75 percent or €235.5 million5. In these small and highly 
competitive markets, the risk of commercialisation in the fight for advertising 
comes to the forefront.  
It has already been shown that in some PSB companies in the West 
the tendency towards light entertainment programming is greater among 
those that rely in part on advertising than in those that do not (Iosifidis, 2007). 
According to a 2010 analysis by the Broadcasting Council, MRT was not 
meeting its PSB programming requirements due to an overabundance of light 
entertainment formats (Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 
2010b). It is important to note that the pertinent period was a time when 
license fee collection was still quite low. RTVSLO has also been pushing the 
limits in terms of advertising in order to compete with its arch-rival, PopTV. In 
recent years the most frequent violations identified by the regulator were the 
overstepping of advertising time limits by both RTVSLO and PopTV. Most 
often, for RTVSLO this has occurred during the airing of major international 
sports events.  
There has been much discussion in recent years as to whether major 
sports events are a commercial product or a public good (See Solberg, 2007),  
and whether they still have a legitimate place in PSB provision. So far the 
European Commission has taken a market-oriented approach, concerned 
more that PSB companies with publicly subsidies enjoy a degree of buying 
power that may distort the market for sports rights (Wheeler, 2009: 264). In 
fact, however, small PSB companies like RTVSLO and MRT do not have 
superior buying power. Both broadcasters complained bitterly that ever fewer 
major sporting events are procurable through the European Broadcasting 
Union [EBU]. If they want a major sports event these companies must enter a 
bidding war with commercial buyers. MRT’s management blame their prime 
time advertising ban for inability to get major sporting events, precisely 
because they have no way to recoup even some of this investment. As 
advertising limits make it difficult to cover costs, some argue there is a risk of 
drawing funding away from core programmes such as informative or cultural 
content (Solberg, 2007). But in RTVSLO and MRT, sports are seen as an 
important collective national experience and part of the core mandate as 
opposed to a luxury to be relegated to pay-tv services.  
As PSB looks to regain initiative, financing is a core issue. While the 
license fee should remain the foundation for financial support, it is not 
necessarily secure or stable, and often is inadequate in small states to fulfil 
the entire breadth of a typical public service mandate. Even in large states the 
license fee may not be sufficient. The withdrawal of advertising from France T
élévisions in 2009 without an increase in the license fee caused panic as to 
how the broadcaster would make up the difference (See Arriaza Ibarra, 2009). 
Although the Slovenian and Macedonian cases highlight risks in 
commercialisation when PSB is allowed to carry advertising, the risks appear 
necessary. Creative thinking is of course essential to figure out how 
advertising in PSB can be structured to discourage unfair competition in light 
entertainment, while guaranteeing fair opportunity to secure the necessary 
resources to offer audiences ‘big ticket’ sporting events and the like.  
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Political independence: Degrees of influence 
 
One reason for a mixed funding model for PSB is to achieve maximum 
independence from the two sources of distortion in the complexion of public 
services: government and commercial interests. However, independence is 
not only a matter of how the endeavour is financed. It is also a question of the 
degree to which political elites are prepared to relinquish control (Jakubowicz, 
2008; Splichal, 2001). In many former communist or socialist countries new 
power elites were reluctant to dismantle old systems of control, even as they 
mimicked the structures and funding mechanisms of the West (ibid.). The 
influence of political elites in PSB is not unique to the East.  
Hallin and Mancini (2004) described four models of PSB governance 
with an emphasis on varying degrees of political influence, although these did 
not include countries of the region we are discussing in this chapter. Even the 
BBC which falls into their professional model, the most insulated from political 
control, was forced to apologise to Tony Blair’s government in 2004 for its 
critical reporting on the government’s justification for going to war in Iraq. 
Expecting PSB to be completely independent from political elites is just not 
realistic. Expectations can only be fairly based on the specific political 
conditions in which each PSB company operates. There is a significant 
difference between RTVSLO and MRT when assessing their independence 
from political elites. Political independence is not a situation of either/or, but of 
degree and with particular regard to subtlety in control.  
 
Manipulation through Financing 
 
Looking at these cases, a factor partly determining the degree of 
political control is the security of finances. While RTVSLO is in relatively good 
shape with a high level of license fee compliance, in Macedonia both of the 
two main political camps publicly called on citizens not to pay the fee in the 
periods when they were respectively in opposition.6 Such manipulation may 
be less possible since the commendable move to transfer fee collection to the 
Public Revenue Office. However, the dangers of this period serve as a 
troublesome reminder that PSB is always vulnerable. During this period MRT 
depended on ad hoc grants from the central government. One staff member 
explained the impact of this:  
 
“While you are dependent on the state, you have to be for the 
state, for the government . . . When you are independent, when 
you have money and can employ people and do what you want 
with equipment; then you can be a bit critical because you don’t 
depend on them financially (anonymous, 2010).” 
 
This put MRT in a Catch-22 situation. While supported by the 
government it cannot truly operate independently and is considered pro-
government. Those in opposition call on an already disappointed citizenry to 
protest by not paying the license fee, thus ensuring that MRT remains 
dependent on the government. This situation indicates the very difficult 
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situation for any PSB company should license fee evasion escalate or their 
financial security be otherwise jeopardised.  
 
Political Culture and Governance 
 
The fact that PSB companies are not independent from political and 
other power elites remains their most disappointing characteristic in CEE 
(Jakubowicz, 2008: 99). It remains a key problem that accounts for accusation 
that they are ‘PSB in name only’. In some cases there is still government 
control over the appointment of editors, sometimes even over programming 
(Bašič-Hrvatin, 2002: 20). Based on the two cases analysed here, it likely that 
these PSB companies are finding it difficult to break the government model of 
governance, although of course to varying degrees depending on the political 
culture. By law both RTVSLO and MRT should fit comfortably in the civic or 
corporatist model as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004), one in which 
control of PSB extends beyond political groups to include other “socially 
relevant groups” (31) such as associations, unions, academic institutions. 
Both PSBs have at least some civil society groups or academic and cultural 
institutions in their governing bodies. However, what happens in reality 
appears more akin to the government model in which the party in power 
controls the PSB. The differing degrees of control exhibited in the two cases 
highlights the role that political culture plays in determining the nature and 
impact of PSB governance.  
Although according to law and the statutes of MRT there is no avenue 
for direct government involvement in appointments, in practice that is quite 
common. One individual admitted, “every time I start to think that I am an 
independent [position removed] I remember that if there was someone else in 
government I would not be here; it would be someone from [political party]. . .” 
7 Because there is no legal mechanism giving government this power, it 
seems to be more a case of informal understandings and political clientelism8 
based on political culture (Jakubowicz, 2008). Within MRT people alternate 
between important positions and figurehead roles depending on which 
political party is in power.   
Slovenia has a different political culture than Macedonia, which may 
explain why efforts by political elites to influence RTVSLO are subtler. In the 
case of RTVSLO political influence has been concentrated at the upper level 
of governance structures. In 1994 a centre-left government created an RTV 
Council composed mostly of civil society representatives, which opposition 
parties claimed was actually controlled by left wing political interests. When a 
centre-right government took power in 2004 it quickly proposed a new make-
up of the Council so that a higher percentage would be appointed by the 
National Assembly, and with some direct party representatives. This passed 
with a very narrow margin in a 2005 referendum (See Bašič-Hrvatin & 
Petkovic, 2007: 144-148). This essentially eroded the civic model that had 
been created earlier. In 2010 another centre left coalition attempted to change 
the RTV Council after winning election in 2008. Debates echoed those 
surrounding previous proposals, although this time the effort failed in a 
referendum. The pattern of successive governments attempting to revamp the 
government structures of RTVSLO is by now firmly established.  
  
 
9 
The question that remains is the extent to which political involvement in 
RTVSLO’s upper level governance structures filters down to programming. It 
appears to depend on the medium and the amount of contact. RTVSLO’s 
Head of Radio Production, Janez Ravnikar, does not have much contact with 
the Council and believes that is for the best: “They do all have some political 
influence. If we would be in daily contact with these members, somehow 
politics would influence the content of our programme”. Radio Slovenia has 
faced little criticism in that regard9, whereas television has been accused of 
being pro-government. A 2006 analysis of RTVSLO’s main television news 
programme Dnevnik, showed that more than 43 percent of those appearing in 
the evening news were from central government, significantly higher than in 
the main private station (Prpič, 2006). Although this may not be evidence of 
clear bias, it does suggest a tendency to rely on protocol news, providing 
coverage to official state sources, events and announcements.  
This concept of protocol news also emerged in relation to MRT’s 
coverage in Macedonia. The idea that MRT had an obligation as PSB to cover 
protocol news and “document” such happenings was expressed by many of 
those in management positions. The Director of MRT’s first television channel, 
Aljosa Simjanovski, claimed it was common practice regardless of which party 
was in power, but admitted it did lead to perceptions of bias among the public. 
It is likely that, depending on the degree of clientelism and a tendency to seek 
control of governance structures, these PSBs will more or less lean towards 
the government model of governance.  
Political manipulation of the PSB, whether though financing or direct 
interventions in governance structures, is not unique to CEE. Caffarel and 
Garcia de Castro (2006) describe how the Spanish PSB was pushed so far 
into debt by government that it’s autonomy was crippled, and a series of 
manipulations of the governing structures followed. Though political cultures 
may differ in terms of the level of clientelism between political elites and PSB, 
it is hard for any PSB to maintain complete independence precisely because 
of its dependence on public funds and the whims of policy makers. Even the 
Dutch PSB suffered significant cuts to its budgets following its criticism of the 
government’s handling of the Fortuyn murder case(Jo Bardoel, 2003: 92). The 
cases examined here point to two things that are important for all PSBs. 
Firstly, as governments look at ways to continue financing PSB in the face of 
increased commercial competition and struggling economies, they must 
provide both stability and diversity. Secondly, political independence is more a 
question of political will than of governance structure. Whether or not civil 
society is included or who appoints board members is not as important as 
political elites deciding to leave the PSB alone and the degree to which 
professionalism within the PSB can isolate programme from influence. As 
RTVSLO and MRT seek to regain initiative, increased financial independence 
and professionalism would facilitate perceptions of being pro-Slovenia and 
pro-Macedonia rather than the mouthpieces of whichever party or coalition is 
in power.  The same applies to other PSB companies as well. It also suggests 
the importance of de-politicization of content and striking a balance by both 
reaching out to minority groups and gathering larger audiences through 
popular social and cultural content (Johannes Bardoel & d'Haenens, 2008).  
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Narrowing the mandate: Culture and co-operation 
 
In their respective laws the lists of obligations for both RTVSLO and MRT 
seem to be little different than those found in the BBC Charter and laws 
framing other PSB companies several times their size. An additional factor in 
both our cases is the requirement that they produce programming in multiple 
constitutionally recognised languages, two in Slovenia and six in Macedonia. 
In talking to managers about the kinds of programmes that are given priority, 
a common focus appears. Although daily news is most demanding of 
resources and attention due to its urgency, both broadcasters are investing in 
content related to nurturing the national culture, particularly in language and 
music. Given their limited resources and difficulties in shaking off the influence 
of political elites, this is an effective strategy for dealing with extensive remits, 
and something to be considered by other PSB companies, particularly in small 
states operating with small budgets.  At the same time, co-operation with 
international and domestic partners emerges as a useful way of filling in the 
gaps in their own production.  
 
Culture, language, and music 
 
As with other PSB operators, in Slovenia and Macedonia cultivating the 
national culture and identity is listed among as an essential obligation. 
However for RTVSLO and MRT it seems to be the most important part of their 
role, specifically that aspect that requires promoting language and music. The 
first things mentioned by MRT Director Eftim Gaštov when asked about the 
mission of MRT were nurturing “national values” and “national identity”. This 
was reinforced when he described the programmes in which MRT is investing, 
namely The Story of Letters about the language, and Macedonia Folk Tales. 
Radio Producer Ravnikar at RTVSLO also mentioned taking care of and 
improving the national culture as main duties for PSB and referred to 
language twice in that context. The same views are present in the 
programmes for minority languages. Reshat Kamberi, Director of the MRT’s 
third radio channel, highlighted the crucial role of the Albanian language radio 
programme in the standardisation of that language in Macedonia. For Antonio 
Rocco, Assistant General Director for Radio and Television for the Italian 
National Community, the preservation of the Italian language and culture in 
Slovenia was the primary purpose of his programmes. This is not to say 
didactic programmes about the language or cultural characteristics are 
preferred. Instead RTVSLO and MRT focus on drama as a vehicle for 
promoting language. One person in RTVSLO explained:  
 
“You put on 5 minutes of a programme about Slovenian language 
and they say, ‘ugh what’s this’, and change the channel. . . Film is 
something that means you can have them for two hours, watching 
in Slovene something that reflects their conditions (anonymous, 
interview, July 2010).” 
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In 2010 RTVSLO doubled film production from the previous year, 
producing four rather than two full-length films. Both broadcasters are also 
investing in television and radio drama series. When licence fee collection 
picked up in 2011, MRT immediately began production of two television 
drama series. In addition to its long running satirical series, MRT’s is now also 
producing radio drama for children and RTVSLO has two studios operating 
that are dedicated to radio drama production.  
The promotion of national music is both a priority and a challenge. 
Small states lack production capacity (Puppis, 2009; Trappel, 1991). In music 
this is not only an issue of equipment and technicians. Macedonia, for 
example, lacks stars; there is a deficit of popular musicians. Multiple 
appearances by the same few saturate the screens and airwaves. Managers 
in MRT express a belief that popularising new stars is an important part of 
their role. RTVSLO is also investing heavily in producing Slovenian music. 
After requirements for Slovenian music had its radio stations repeating the 
same recordings too many times, RTVSLO has modernised studios for its 
own orchestra and big band. It is devoting significant resources to recording 
classical, big band, folk and sometimes even rock. The emphasis on authentic 
national music was clear in both broadcasters, including within the minority 
language programmes.  
 
Co-operation filling the gaps 
 
Although both RTVSLO and MRT broadcast educational programming 
in the form of didactic children’s programmes and documentaries, these 
programmes were not priorities except when related to language. 
Documentary or informative programmes on generalist subjects such as 
science, history and nature are well covered by foreign channels and subtitled 
in local languages. There is also a clear impression that RTVSLO and MRT 
cannot compete with the content offered on such channels. As one person 
explained, audiences do not want to see a rabbit in a Slovenian field on 
RTVSLO when they can see an anaconda on Animal Planet. At the moment 
both RTVSLO and MRT are still producing some documentaries related to 
local topics and basic educational programmes for children, however much of 
their other generalist informative content is managed through co-operation. 
While this is may be an adequate solution for fulfilling the requirements, it 
suggests that perhaps it is time to re-evaluate the extent of the generalist PSB 
mandate, particularly for smaller operators in smaller countries.  
Co-operation can mean working with domestic independent producers 
or even other public institutions. Due to conditions for overtime pay and 
working hours in contracts for RTVSLO employees, producers find that for 
some productions it is cheaper to outsource. Producing drama was 
considered a priority in both RTVSLO and MRT, yet drama is expensive to 
produce. Partnerships with other public institutions such as theatres are one 
way that MRT is managing to produce drama programmes. One example is a 
children’s radio drama produced with the Theatre for Young People.  
Both RTVSLO and MRT make use of the EBU and co-operation with 
other broadcasters. They use the EBU network for their informative 
programmes, as well as international wire services. Films and documentaries 
are also exchanged within the network, allowing them to leverage their 
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production by getting several programmes from EBU members in return. 
Institutional arrangements with broadcasters in neighbouring countries are 
also important for providing content in minority languages. MRT’s Albanian 
programmes exchange with RTK in Kosovo and RTSH in Albania, each 
contributing the type of programming in which they are strongest. The Italian 
language programmes of RTVSLO exchange with RAI in Italy. In Macedonia, 
both television and radio rely heavily on agreements for rebroadcast that they 
have with BBC, Deutsche Welle and even CNN for international news.10 
International co-operation at the regional and European level helps both 
RTVSLO and MRT meet some of their obligations and enrich their programme 
offer with minimal resources.  
RTVSLO and MRT are not the only PSB companies struggling to fulfil a 
broad generalist mandate with minimal resources and the problem is not 
limited to small countries. Since 2008 both France and Spain have decided to 
eliminate advertising, cutting a huge source of revenue from their PSBs to the 
benefit of the generalist commercial channels (Arriaza Ibarra, 2009). The 
changes for Spain’s RTVE also include severe limits to its procurement of 
sports rights and higher obligations towards domestic film production (ibid. : 
274), which seems to indicate a direction of mandate narrowing away from the 
kind of content provided by commercial stations. Although the held up for 
many years is the PSB that does everything, it may be time to consider what 
exactly PSBs need to be doing in their specific national contexts.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The reason for looking more closely at the Slovenian and Macedonian cases 
was not to outline the nature of their unique struggles, but rather to see if 
there are similarities in those struggles with the situation elsewhere and, 
especially, to see if there is something to be learned from their experiences of 
coping that should be generally useful as PSB everywhere attempts to regain 
initiative in difficult times. I return therefore to the three questions posed at the 
beginning.  
The first question related to the risks of different funding sources. Here 
I argue that we cannot be complacent about the license fee as a secure 
source. In times of crisis and stiffening competition the license fee is often 
under attack. For small countries this method is also limited in the amount that 
it can generate as a function of population size and economic resources 
overall. Advertising, while also unstable and carrying the risk of encouraging 
commercialisation, appears necessary in many cases. This is especially true if 
PSB is expected to be one of the means through which audiences have 
access to expensive forms of content, such as sports broadcast. The worst-
case scenario is being forced to rely on ad hoc influxes of funds from central 
government. Near-automatic grants from the central budget for particular 
services, not subject to the whims of those in power, are a better alternative. 
However, anything that requires PSB to directly negotiate for funds can be 
dangerous to political independence.  
Even if outright financial manipulation is not a problem, we still must 
consider what is reasonable to expect in terms of political independence. In 
the two cases what can be expected is a level of political influence quite 
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similar to other countries in Southern Europe, typically fitting the polarised 
pluralist model (Daniel C. Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Jakubowicz (2008) clearly 
identified many similarities between the media systems of polarised pluralist 
countries around the Mediterranean and those of the post-communist states. 
He also concluded that any move “northward” would take a long time (ibid.: 
118). It is hard to imagine that the levels of clientelism and pressure from 
political elites in Slovenia or Macedonia are likely to change drastically in the 
near future. Therefore, in these cases, and I suggest in others from the 
region, the goal of the PSB should be to achieve a situation in which they are 
at least perceived as being pro-country rather than aligned to particular 
political parties. 
Hope for movement in this direction is derived from the response to the 
last question regarding a revision of the PSB remit. Both RTVSLO and MRT 
are focusing their energies on particular aspects related to language, culture 
and national identity. This is an appropriate tactic for other states fitting the 
politically polarised model. If these PSB firms are able to develop their 
relationships with their publics through non-political programming such as 
drama and sport, they may be able use this support as an antidote to undue 
political influence (Johannes Bardoel & d'Haenens, 2008). Increased co-
operation and exchange with other PSB companies may also provide some 
distance from national political party influence.  
The PSB as a politically independent generalist broadcaster that 
provides all types of high quality content and is the keystone of domestic 
production is an ideal. As competition from commercial broadcasters grows 
and political elites appear evermore interested in supporting commercial 
broadcasting interests, this ideal will be increasingly harder to reach in both 
East and West. Governments in Western Europe and wider that are looking to 
cut funding to PSB should recall the lessons from CEE, avoiding drastic 
sudden changes and maintaining diverse sources of funding. As belts tighten 
in PSB in general, it may be time to re-examine the generalist mandate of 
PSB. While PSB should not only be relegated to a niche of “worthy” 
programming that fails to attract audiences (Arriaza Ibarra, 2009: 278), 
countries, especially smaller ones, should be thinking about what the core 
functions of PSB need to be in their national contexts. In doing so they should 
look beyond the traditional PSB territory of linear radio and television to make 
use of new platforms and in places where politicization is a problem, perhaps 
focus on non-political content.  
 
 
End Notes 
 
                                                
1 By Central and Eastern European States I refer to the former communist countries that formed the 
Warsaw Pact alliance until 1991 and the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia. Although 
Yugoslavia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned states and significantly more open than the 
countries in the Warsaw Pact, it maintained a highly centralised single party socialist system of 
government and economy until it broke up in 1991. 
2 An earlier law in 1990 had simply renamed the RTV Assembly as the RTV Council and designated 
that its members be selected by the new national Parliament as opposed to the republic level 
institutions that had existed within Yugoslavia. 
3 In the three years prior to 2009 the collection rates only ran between 1 and 5 per cent (Beličanec, 
2009: 3). 
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4 RTVSLO is allowed up to 12 minutes per hour and 9 minutes during prime time for a total of up to 
10 per cent of daily transmission time (Republic of Slovenia 2007, Art. 98). Commercial stations in 
Slovenia can devote up to 15 per cent of daily transmission time to advertisements, but also are allowed 
only 12 minutes per hour (Republic of Slovenia 2007, Art. 97). MRT, on the other hand is allowed only 
7 per cent of an hour, or just over 4 minutes and is banned completely from advertising in prime time, 
while commercial stations can use up to 12 minutes per hour for advertising (Republic of Slovenia 
2007, Art. 91 & 93). 
5 Figures for 2009 advertising market in Slovenia were drawn from data published by research agency 
Mediana in Dnevnik in January 2010. 
6 VMRO-DPMNE in 2006 (REF) and SDSM in 2010 (C.J., 2010) 
7 Some identifying information and the complete date of the interview have been left out in order to 
protect the identity of the person interviewed. 
8 Clientelism, also sometimes called patronage, refers to the systematic dependence on an asymmetric 
exchange of favours, services or often political support. For conceptual discussion of the definition and 
impact on political institutions see Graziano (1976), and for examples of clientelism in relation to 
media systems see Hallin (2002). 
9 The Director of MRT’s first radio channel, Daniela Kanevce, also stated that she felt comfortably 
isolated from political pressure, mentioning only the obligation to air long government sponsored 
public service announcements, which she felt were generally in the public interest. 
10 Since these interviews were conducted the BBC world service has cut Macedonian and Albanian 
language programmes that were rebroadcast on MRT. 
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